A recent report (the second of its type) by the European Environmental Agency, titled Late Lessons from Early Warnings looked at situations where we had early warnings about problems, but our public institutions failed to do anything substantive about the early warnings. When we think of the problems confronting the global environment today, this seems to fit the bill on many issues. We are fairly sure that the oceans are collapsing, that biodiversity is stressed to the limit, the the climate is warming beyond 2 degrees, and that the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other countries will only make these problems worse.

Make sure to read through the report, it is pretty good and covers diverse issues from tobacco, methylmercury, pollution, to nanotechnology and others. The report itself is organized around thinking about the precautionary principle and its application in complex world.  But in answering that question is poses an answer to the question I’m asking about why we don’t hear early warnings.

There are some good answers provided in the report:

• Complexity limits our ability to identify causes of problems.
• We don’t have adequate evidence or risk assessment procedures.
• Economic interests for business to ignore long-term consequences.
• And maladaptive institutions.

My instincts tell me that another aspect might be presentation (which is accounted for in the report, but downplayed in my opinion). Without proposing a communication theory answer, which I am not equipped to posit, it seems reasonable that the explanation may be that people play with multiple risks and decide which ones to handle based upon their depictions. Far away and widely distributed problems will get ignored, close and narrowly spread problems will receive action.

Think about the supposed economy-environment debate.  I’ve heard multiple times that in the global recession, environmental action has become very difficult.  There is a simple hierarchy of needs argument that people prioritize their economic well-being and when that is threatened, they deemphasize environmental risks. In contrast to this argument, I want to posit a hierarchy of risk argument. The highest prioritized argument will be the one with the shortest timeframe and closest spread.

Think about if you have ever had friends who don’t wear seat belts in the car: when do they do this mostly? In my experience, it is when they are in the backseat (what!) and on shorter trips. Longer trips and those where they are in the front seat typically result in seat belt use.  It is not that they are prioritizing their need for comfort or lazyness over safety; they are decreasing the risk because of time frame and their perceived impact.

So, why don’t we hear early warnings: one partial answer may be that we need to reclarify the risks.  The global economic problems are presented as widespread (and indeed they hurt many people, but the impact has not been equal) and of immediate risk to people. Environmental dangers are perceived as being random (extreme weather might not impact you for many years) and as being of a long time frame.  However, neither of these are correct assessments. Climate change is having global impact and may continue doing so; it is not random nor in the future.

This is very preliminary and should only be taken with requisite unit of sodium: but, maybe it isn’t the science or the ability to weed through complexity, but it is the frames being put on environmental issues which leads to ignored early warnings. Regardless, when the next IPCC report is released, all preliminary work suggests it will be a significant warning on climate change. Will people listen?

I want to ask a more important question today: What would have happened if the Kyoto protocol had been expired at the Doha climate negotiations a few weeks ago?  At the Doha negotiations states agreed to two things (pretty much): 1. extend Kyoto until 2020 and 2. set up funding for climate disaster relief to developing states.  I think the first was done because of fear of what a world without Kyoto would look like and the second is a third best outcome (when you can’t get funding for mitigation and you can’t get funding for adaptation…you get inefficient disaster relief).

Let’s critically examine the first aspect: fear of what a world without Kyoto would mean has led to its extension.  If Kyoto expired, states would be generally free to set their own emission decisions and it may undermine some efforts by states, possibly those beset by environmental problems, to actually try and adhere.  Secondarily (and I suspect this is the bigger fear in European delegates) is that if Kyoto expires it will make secondary agreements harder to develop.

Part 1: What will happen to carbon emissions?

To think about this, I did some very simple thinking.  The question is this: If Kyoto went away this year, who would reverse their efforts at decreasing carbon and what would be the impact of those?

Data: I used data on emissions put together in a great way by the Guardian in June of this year.  It is emissions per country for 1980-2010 (or later if the country came into existence at a later date).  With that, I then took the April 2011 Gallup survey of 111 countries and looked at percentage of respondents in each country who considered climate change to be human caused.

Assumptions: Here’s my thoughts.  If a country wants to leave the Kyoto protocol now, they can.  Example: Canada. The determinant for whether a country leaves Kyoto targets or not is dependent upon (in this order) domestic politics then regional organizations, then worldwide climate condemnation.  So, if there is one person who decides whether the country is going to leave the Kyoto they first look at domestic concerns, then whether there are regional concerns (is climate change effort part of free trade system?), and finally they consider international response.  A country will leave Kyoto if a small percentage of the population believe climate change is human caused, and if they are not part of regional trade agreements that are connected to climate change efforts, and if they do not have a reputation for being an international environmental scofflaw internationally.  If any of these conditions are not met (if domestic awareness is high, etc), the assumption is that they will continue working on Kyoto targets.  So, if Kyoto expired, what is the likelihood of them giving up their efforts?

Who leaves?  Based on these simple assumptions and the data above, I believe the following countries would be likely to flaunt any expiration of Kyoto by ending any pretense to reach Kyoto targets: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Botswana, Senegal, Armenia, South Africa, Afghanistan, Chad, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Nigeria, Guyana, Georgia, Haiti, Iceland, Iraq, Burundi, Saudi Arabia, Guinea, Liberia, Zimbabwe, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Togo, Zambia, Rwanda, Singapore, Benin, Norway, Belarus, Moldova, Mauritania, Nepal, Namibia, Vietnam.  That totals 2,250 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2010.  That is about 1/4th of the carbon emissions from the U.S. in 2010.

But how many of those countries are required to do something under Kyoto or are currently reducing carbon emissions?  Every single one of them was given no targets in Kyoto to reduce emissions.  Most are developing countries that were given no targets in the Kyoto agreement.  Those that were given targets were given targets to limit the amount of increase they had and not to cut emissions at all.  Iceland has a plus 10 percentage from 1990 levels in Kyoto.  Which means their goal is to only increase their emissions by 10% (They increased more than that by the way).  Norway was given a plus 1 percentage in Kyoto (They increased a lot more than that).

In addition, not a single country on the list is doing great efforts to reduce emissions.  Any emission reduction (in Zambia or Moldova, for instance) are probably a result of wider scale economic downturns.  So, if every country that could easily escape Kyoto’s requirements did immediately after it was allowed to lapse, that would cause no significant change in worldwide carbon emissions.  The states which are likely to revel in the ending of the Kyoto agreement are those which are either 1. expected not to cut emissions in Kyoto or 2. those which have not participated significantly in cutting emissions through efforts.  So, if Kyoto expired, some countries would free themselves, but probably mostly the countries that are free to start with.

In other words, if Kyoto expired and the EU carbon efforts remain in tact, we should not expect any noticeable increase in carbon emissions as a result.

There are two conditions in which we should expect that Kyoto expiration would change this scenario: if the EU system collapses or if early lock-in efforts, which  have been undertaken in countries that haven’t shown results yet but will soon, are undermined.

Collapse of the EU system: The probability of collapsing the EU climate system is fairly unlikely.  But, I do think it is possible if Kyoto went away.  The most dangerous would be if one or more key states withdrew from the EU system with the opening at the expiration of Kyoto.  So, if the second assumption is suspended in the discussion above, we could see UK, Estonia, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Lithuania, and Austria all as potential defectors.  If each of these countries completely abandoned efforts to reach Kyoto targets we would expect an increase around 70-100 million metric tons.  However, more importantly, these states may reduce trading and other efforts in Europe causing general reduction in the ability of those policies to work.  With domestic pressure and slow policy response, we should expect the core to remain and this should keep even some of the above countries around because they receive significant benefits (many are carbon trading exporters in Europe.  We should thus expect that the expiration of Kyoto is a low probability event with consequences limited by domestic politics and carbon trading systems.

Reversal of potentially good policies: It is possible to argue that there are some efforts taken by states which have not shown impacts yet but which could be reversed reducing any positive impacts.  If these exist, no one seems to have identified them.  Indeed in the UNEP 2012 Emissions Gap report it is clear that current efforts are unlikely to start having a larger impact.  It is more probable that the impact is likely to fall short unless additional efforts are undertaken.  Let’s also consider this a low probability possibility at this point but one which might occur.

To summarize: If Kyoto expired, we should not expect emissions to increase significantly unless it dismantles the EU system or reverses policies with delayed effects (both of which are low probability events).

Part 2: What will happen to carbon negotiations?

It seems unfathomable today to think about progress on Ozone or acid rain in Europe without those first breakthrough agreements setting up the further agreements.  How likely is it and how big an impact would it have for climate negotiations if Kyoto expired?

I think it is very unlikely to think that Kyoto expiration would cause any serious disruption to climate negotiations.  Although often times the Kyoto is considered a stepping stone, it does not appear to have made secondary stones easier.  Negotiations have largely departed from a world based on Kyoto to a world of other focuses.  It seems like breaking away from Kyoto is as likely to lead to the next substantive negotiation as keeping Kyoto alive is.

The unceremonious, quick extension of Kyoto seems to be a clear sign that negotiators know this.  They seem to understand that the next agreement will be a second foundational agreement and not merely an extension of Kyoto.  The issue then is that working on a new foundational agreement may be messy with the old foundational agreement still around.  (Future post: What break through could have been possible without Kyoto hanging around at Doha?) Working toward the same end, just with a clean slate may allow some of the issues (like funding or common responsibility) to be dealt with in a clear and efficient manner.  Building a governance arrangement without Kyoto can allow a more coherent and less complex, jigsaw system to arise.  Negotiations have already become overly segmented in climate negotiations and keeping Kyoto and the next governance system around may be a recipe for additional problems.

The result is that it seems at least equally likely that Kyoto expiration will result in a better next agreement than that it will result in a halt to negotiations.  In fact, since we cannot assume that there will be any reduction in domestic pressure that it is actually more likely that letting Kyoto expire can allow progress to focus on a brand new system rather than a system of mixed pieces of Kyoto, new system and other orders.

(One side note, I’ve been working on here on Rio+20 about how small, jigsaw governance could be the future for effective global environmental politics. This is not a renunciation of that position; but, instead simply saying that that system would be assisted by a good, formal climate change agreement and framework. International treaties and agreements are not aided by a stalled system that will be incoherent if/when finished.  So the argument is simply that in order to get a good international agreement, which is one piece of international action that needs to happen on climate change, we need to think about how best to get there.)

Conclusion The costs appear to be significantly lower than a first glance would presume.  Europe is unlikely to defect entirely from the climate change system and negotiations will persist regardless of what happened to Kyoto. A few countries would probably celebrate in the end of Kyoto and increase carbon without regard; but those are mostly the countries doing that anyway.  The costs from letting Kyoto expire are small or mitigated by other factors, the benefits are risky, for sure, but are at least worthy of consideration.

One final note is that, as I mentioned above, this might already be the path we are on and negotiators merely extended Kyoto to be safe and have moved on.  No statements are being made saying this, but it appears likely with the extension of Kyoto taking up little formal discussion, that this is what may be happening.  If true, the next Conference of the Parties will send clearer signals.

Barry Saxifrage, a top-notch climate writer, recently produced this chart comparing global CO2 levels in parts per million to key meetings on the climate change negotiations timeline.

“Eighteen years of COP meetings, task forces, brinkmanship, declarations, policies, promises and protocols have not slowed the rise in global CO2 one tiny bit.” -Barry Saxifrage

Let’s imagine that everything goes right for Kyoto in the next few years: the U.S. signs the protocol, Europe meets its obligations, and common but differentiated responsibility actually means common effort by the developing world.  Will we see this chart change course or at least level off?

The answer is a firm No.  Europe and the U.S. are doing weak efforts at reducing emissions.  The U.S. is largely letting market forces reduce emissions, with the switch away from coal, and about half of Europe will hit the Kyoto targets.  Both of them have decoupled carbon emissions from economic growth.  But, the problem is what the problem was in 1997 when Kyoto was created; from James Traub, “The West has largely succeeded in bending downwards the curve of carbon emissions. But the developing world has not. Last year, China’s emissions rose 9.3 percent; India’s, 8.7 percent. China is now the world’s No. 1 source of carbon emissions, followed by the United States, the European Union, and India.”

This isn’t to say that the U.S. and Europe are immune from blame for Kyoto’s failures, they largely let the issue reach this point.  The U.S. unwillingness to be a leader on the issue meant that common but differentiated responsibility, the provision which allowed developing countries to commit to cutting emissions with no real targets like developed countries adopted, never got the chance to get working.  Europe’s do-it-yourself strategy convinced Russia to join the Kyoto protocol at the deadline, but similarly did not foster an environment for developing countries to agree to cuts.  And now that there is a widespread financial crisis, it seems unlikely that anyone is willing to actually spend the money to make common but differentiated responsibility work.

The result is Kyoto has done nothing in 15 years since its signature, and even in a best case scenario, it is unlikely to do anything in the next 8 years.

But what if it gets scrapped, won’t that be worse?  I don’t see how.  The U.S. system is largely now Kyoto-independent, although the agreement gets some nods in local, state, and regional initiatives, it is not a driver of efforts in the U.S.  In Europe, the Kyoto targets are enshrined in EU level efforts and national legislation.  If Kyoto had expired, these laws would be retained and the obligations could continue to exist.  Although I would expect one state in Eastern Europe or two to test a situation (Poland, probably) where Kyoto expires, the vast majority of countries won’t.  The political pressure in most countries comes domestically and international pressure has had little impact.

Why are people clinging to Kyoto then and keeping it alive on life support? I think there are two reasons: 1. Europe believes negotiations from an earlier agreement are easier.  When you have an agreement, the argument is that negotiators can work on key issues like funding, administration, and increasing provisions.  That worked on Ozone negotiations, WTO negotiations, EU negotiations…but it hasn’t worked on climate negotiations.  15 meetings since and obligations for developing countries have increased nothing, funding provisions have developed not at all, adaptation became an issue and went nowhere, and membership has largely been maintained.  Assumptions need to be questioned when there is constant evidence to the contrary and climate change requires us to rethink the idea that negotiations get better when there is a starting agreement. (There are more skeptical reasons for why Europe may invest so much in Kyoto, but I give them the benefit of the doubt). 2. The developing world likes common but differentiated responsibility.  Kyoto’s extension means the continuation of an agreement with no requirements on developing countries and they are unlikely to let that end.  Kyoto is a bad agreement, but it serves some interests very well (that was the point of the agreement when it was signed).

So, Kyoto is seen as a positive position by Europe (and probably AOSIS) for future negotiations and an advantageous position to the developing world.  But the chances of Kyoto having an effect are unlikely in the current array unless they get the U.S. involved and get requirements on the developing world.

The best strategy for achieving that outcome is to give up on Kyoto and let it lapse.  The Kyoto path is a dead end.  And it is just getting us farther from the right road at this point.  Ideally a new agreement would replace Kyoto and give it a proper sendoff.  But it is getting to the point where the best possibility of that is to let Kyoto lapse.

The situation could get worse without Kyoto existing, but it is hard to see exactly how that would get worse.  Europe, Australia, and Japan are locked in, the U.S. efforts are independent of Kyoto, and Kyoto has little effect on the rest of the world.  Maybe it is time to let it fade away and let us start over.

Here’s the deal: The U.S. simply refuses to be part of the solution to climate negotiations.  That doesn’t mean that it has the same policy that it did during the Bush years (which could only be described as outright hostility to climate negotiations), but that the results are largely the same.  The U.S. leadership on this issue is exactly its passivity.  This isn’t like other issues where the U.S. has largely disinteres (biological diversity), outright attempts to undermine (biosafety for GMOs), leading by following (ocean dumping) or hesitant assistance (hazardous materials trade).  No, the climate issue has become one where the U.S. is inserting itself through forceful passivity.

Forceful passivity may seem like a contradictory approach, but it is exactly what the United States is doing at international climate negotiations. Evidence of their passivity is shown in the ENB reports of the Doha Climate Conference, where the U.S. plays a marginal role at best. The December 6 ENB report of the Doha Climate Conference exemplifies this point with no real participation by the U.S. in the effort.

The forceful aspect of this passivity is shown in the debate on the one big outcome that the Doha Climate Conference produced.  Poor countries were able to get recognition and promises of aid from the impacts of disasters for “loss and damage from climate change”.  The Guardian though highlighted that this achievement was seen as a second-best effort as a result of the U.S. obstruction.  The Guardian writes: “Ronald Jumeau, negotiating for the Seychelles, scolded the US negotiator: ‘If we had had more ambition [on emissions cuts from rich countries], we would not have to ask for so much [money] for adaptation. If there had been more money for adaptation [to climate change], we would not be looking for money for loss and damage. What’s next? Loss of our islands?’” The argument made is simple: U.S. (and other countries) have largely failed on funding carbon emission reductions, they have largely failed on funding for adaptation, and so now, the only option was creation of a payment for loss system.

Before I go on, I want to note that although the recognition of payment for countries damaged by climate change is important and a good achievement, the actual obligation on countries seems very weak.  There is no real structure, no real guidance, no formal articulation of how this is going to work.  It seems likely that what will happen will be that when the U.S. sends aid to hurricane of typhoon victims, they will just check a box saying it is for loss due to climate change and that few new funds will be created as a result of this outcome.  So celebrate for sure, but do see this as a third-best solution, and weakly implemented.

So, the U.S. is passive at international climate negotiations but is good at using its veto position to prevent progress on issues.  It makes the saying “If you aren’t part of the solution, you are part of the problem” ring quite true.  The forcible passivity of the United States is a significant problem on international climate negotiations for the next decade.  There will be little incentive for developing countries to agree to any cuts in their emissions without either acquiescence by the United States or (even better) actual leadership by the United States.

That is where we are at going forward: A forcibly passive prime player (the United States), a developing state block which is willing to act if there is funding (the G77 and China), Europe who is stuck in a tough position and opts for the moral high ground but may be actually decreasing their leadership on the issue.  Europe’s leadership needs the United States.  The developing states will not agree to anything without the U.S. agreeing to a significant cut and funding emission cuts elsewhere.  As long as the U.S. retains its forceful passivity, this arrangement seems unlikely to move in any positive direction.

And, if the loss and damage provision is actually implemented, the costs on the U.S. could become quite severe.  The problem is not going to decrease, and the forceful passivity at this point in time is only raising the problem for everyone.

In fact, I consider ambition to be so light and airy that it’s only the shadow of a shadow. -Rosencrantz from Hamlet

Some phrases seem to come out of nowhere and then  become absolutely prominent in discussions.  And one such phrase is the “ambition gap” at the Doha Climate conference.  The idea became important at the Durban conference, but it is really becoming key at Doha.  However, like so many issues there appears to be some disagreement about it.  And a key question for us is whether this is an important issue or a side-show?

Here’s my definition of the ambition gap: The agreements made were not ambitious enough to solve the problem.  Another plausible definition is that there are different levels of ambition between countries (it appears this may have been the use in some early discussions).  However, the ambition gap seems to be a gap between what has been agreed to and what needs to be done.  It is important to remember that the Kyoto Protocol was originally designed not as a good enough solution, but a first step toward working for a good solution.  But then we haven’t progressed much on that because of U.S. opposition and the inability to integrate in developing countries to the requirements.

As far as I can find (and this is a preliminary sketch of idea), the idea of an ambition gap, phrased as such, really got going at the Durban Climate Conference.  From the ENB report:

The EU suggested that the decision focus on: recognizing and establishing a process to narrow the ambition gap; an international, common rules-based accounting system; and a process to understand the assumptions underlying current pledges. On the level of ambition, Switzerland, for the EIG, suggested: a process to increase ambition; technical workshops; and further consideration at COP 18. The US said the Cancun Agreements do not establish a process for narrowing the ambition gap and this should be considered in the 2013-2015 review. NEW ZEALAND, supported by AUSTRALIA and NORWAY, proposed a template as a flexible tool to capture information on pledges, including on sectors, metrics, gases and time frames covered.

This idea has certainly existed before Durban, but it was at Durban that the idea was conceptualized as a gap and an agenda item.  In the Kyoto-Copenhagen years, the major focus was how to get Kyoto working.  But following Copenhagen, the agenda has switched to getting a good agreement.  As shown in the quote above, the agenda gap was postponed until COP 18 (the Doha Conference).  And so, Doha has come.

Before I get onto Doha, remember that we do have a number of different gaps.  We have the emissions gap which is the gap between our emissions and where our emissions should be to limit warming to 2 degrees.  There is the commitment period gap, which is impending and all but assured without a new agreement (what that means is probably not as bad as it could be because of the Cancun, Durban, and Doha meetings).  And others.  But the ambition gap is certainly one of the main problems.

Enter the Doha meeting and the following discussions of the ambition gap from today (not much done on the earlier days), all from the ENB link above:

China, for BASIC, urged developed countries to raise their level of ambition in line with science and their historical responsibility, and suggested further discussions on ambition under the COP or CMP.

Swaziland, for the AFRICAN GROUP, underlined that work on pre-2020 mitigation provides additional opportunities to close the ambition gap but is not an alternative to commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and the AWG-LCA

What is interesting to me about these statements is that both China and Swaziland, as the representatives of different groups, seem to be arguing that the ambition gap is somewhat of a side project that may be a distraction from the core project.  China wants it moved to the main Conference of the Parties and Swaziland makes clear that the ambition gap can be dealt with in a lot of forums, but that we need to keep our focus on the core agenda.

Without going into why developing countries might be wary of this, it is simply sufficient to note that the ambition gap is seen differently by the various actors.  While I want to have states agree to better requirements, I also feel there may be something problematic about an agenda item on the ambition gap.  And here’s my problem: Let’s focus on the emissions gap and get some agreement.  The ambition gap seems like a middle point on the process and not a crucial step.

We’ll see tomorrow and the rest of this week if the “ambition gap” keeps being a big issue.  As shorthand for trying to do better, it is useful.  As an agenda item, it may be a needless series of meetings that should happen in more high-profile settings. I’m not sure what it is yet.  There appears to be some warranted skepticism out there about it, but it certainly isn’t nailed down yet.  So, let’s watch the ambition gap and hope it works well, but let’s also make sure it is not just the shadow of a shadow.

So, Lullaby of the Commons says once again: I will not become pessimistic about climate negotiations.  (That is 104 times now)

Make sure to keep up with the negotiations in Doha at Earth Negotiations Bulletin: here you go.

In two days, delegations from around the world will start the 18th Conference of the Parties for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  Climate negotiations are in a precarious position.  Kyoto has largely failed to produce stronger agreement by states (undermined by its lack of requirements on developing countries and opposition by the U.S.), the attempts to resuscitate climate efforts have continually fell flat (in Copenhagen, Cancun, and Durban), and the recent UN report that the best efforts being organized currently are likely to leave a significant amount of carbon emissions above where we would have to be to keep warming under 2 degrees.  And so, it comes to Doha.  After Hurricane Sandy, after the U.S. Presidential election.  What will be the likely legacy of this meeting.

Doha, right now, is a depreciated brand name.  In November 2001, the World Trade Organization met for its meeting in Doha, this was two years after the meeting in Seattle was disrupted by protests and significant internal divergence on the goals of the next round for the organization.  The result was the Doha Declaration which was  a broad-based attempt to make progress on multiple issues largely by agreeing to strengthen different issues.  In general the deal was to push trade liberalization on issues important to developing countries (mainly agricultural goods) at the same time as liberalization for issues important to developed countries (investment and intellectual property). At the time, celebration about the outcome was quite bold.  WTO Director General Mike Moore, whose role seemed to be mainly sustained optimism, said a month after the Doha meeting that:

“We tend to talk rather glibly about the historic importance of such events, but this time, for once, the claim is not exaggerated; the meeting at Doha will be remembered as a turning-point in the history of the WTO and the trading system and in relations between developed and developing countries within that system.”

10 years later how has this agreement done?  Jagdish Bhagwati  seemed to summarize the issue precisely by writing that:

“The Doha Round, the latest phase of multilateral trade negotiations, failed in November 2011, after 10 years of talks…But that is hardly the end of the matter: the failure of Doha will virtually halt multilateral trade liberalisation for years to come.”

Doha, unless a near-miracle somehow occurs, is largely a untrusted brand on the path of multilateralism.  Not quite Seattle or Genoa, but nowhere near any of the success stories.  So, the COP18 is not just a chance to address the deepening political problem of climate, but a chance to put Doha in relevance again.

I see three possibilities likely:

1. All Celebration, Little Work.  The WTO conference at Doha was this outcome.  All celebration about coming to an agreement after the scuttled efforts in Seattle, but not with the hard work of actually figuring out how to combine the varied agenda items, work out problems, and get implementation going.  Rio+20 may have been a similar outcome.  This is a bad outcome.  But there is a simple test, just ask: what else new did states agree to?  If they agreed to some common understandings or reiterating earlier agreements, then the celebration is self-congratulations.  If they actually agree to something, if the U.S. decides to start being a leader, if China, India, and Brazil agree to some reductions, all of these show that maybe we haven’t worked out all the specifics, but that some celebration is warranted.
2. Collapse. In this instance, negotiations accomplish nothing.  We’re not at this point yet.  However, if states abandon the goal of trying to keep warming within 2 degrees, this would represent the failure and probable collapse of international climate change negotiations.  Although state parties will be unlikely to repudiate the goal, if the discourse moves dramatically away from this goal, be wary.
3. Little Celebration, All work.  A major breakthrough on climate negotiations is unlikely to happen.  Far more likely is some reiteration of prior agreements and some significant work by negotiators in figuring out how to get developing countries to agree to emission limits, how to get the U.S. into the system, and how to get Europe working again.  Negotiators seem to be very happy with such an effort.  A good example might be the Uruguay round of WTO negotiations which sat idle for many years until finally breaking through.

My guess is that #1 is the most likely outcome.  In which case, the legacy of Doha will be a place to produce all shine and little substance in international negotiations–a dubious honor.  However, if COP18 produces a positive work agenda with strong affirmations of the 2 degree goal, Doha’s legacy may be improved significantly.  It won’t, and shouldn’t, be the main concern of the negotiations and the next couple of days; however, it should be something reflected on after the conference in order to assess its effectiveness and understand how international agreements are working.  Let’s see.

To quote from the report:

Current global greenhouse gas emissions, based on 2010 data from bottom-up emission inventory studies, are estimated at 50.1 GtCO2e (with a 95% uncertainty range of 45.6 – 54.6). This is already 14% higher than the median estimate (44 GtCO2e) of the emission level in 2020 with a likely chance of meeting the 2°C target. This is also about 20% higher than emissions in 2000. Global emissions are now picking up again after their decline during the economic downturn between 2008 and 2009.

To make this simple: We want the carbon emissions to be at 44 gigatons to keep warming under 2°C by 2020.  Right now, they estimate we are at 50.1 gigatons.  Meaning already there is a carbon gap of 6.1 gigatons of carbon emissions yearly.  If we don’t make any cuts and just stay at the same level, that is a large emissions gap.  If carbon emissions increase, like they are projected in China, India, Brazil and elsewhere, then that only widens the gap.

Aside from the bad news, there was one point that stuck out to me in the report (which has been made before, but which I glossed over).  To put the claim in its strongest possible form (which the report does not): We have until about 2020 for climate coalitions to continue to operate, and at that point they will become largely irrelevant.

Climate coalitions are a result of the stalled efforts on climate change at the international level.  The first climate coalition was developed in Kyoto with the inclusion of common but differentiated responsibility. The idea was that Europe, Japan, Australia, and North America would cut their emissions while the rest of the world (the developing countries) would not have any firm commitments put upon them.  With the failure of the Kyoto process, climate coalitions sprouted in various forms.  The European Union deciding to institute Kyoto even without the United States, the Chicago Climate Exchange, C40 Cities, and with California pushing its own laws on the issue.

These climate coalitions could actually work.  The report is clear that if all these actors actually fulfill their promises, we would close the emissions gap significantly; however, they note that right now many of them have not started the efforts and future push may be difficult.  However, in the report is a series of discussions which while the report authors don’t push toward this conclusion (nor do they push for a different conclusion) which says that climate coalitions could have worked, but if we don’t close the emissions gap by 2020 they will largely become irrelevant.

The report explains that  “Emission scenarios analyzed in this report and consistent with a ‘likely’ chance of meeting the 2°C target have a peak
before 2020.” Simulations show that if we miss this and emissions do not peak until after 2020, the result will be that coverage by groups of dedicated actors will grow increasingly problematic.   First, it will have higher costs:

A pathway with no mitigation action by 2020 will see emissions rise during this decade while mitigation costs up to 2020 will be zero. However, after that, higher emission reduction rates will be required. As a result, pathways with high 2020 emissions will have markedly higher mitigation costs post-2020 in order to limit warming to below 2°C.

But second, it will also need near-universal membership:

All later action scenarios meeting the 2°C target and having emission levels in 2020 near to the most optimistic pledge cases… assume full global participation in stringent climate mitigation from 2020 onwards.

If we are going to keep warming under the two degree target, we can either encourage climate coalitions now or need universal climate action after 2020.  When international efforts to agree to relatively minor issues are unable to achieve even modest goals, the possibility of needing near-universal climate action post-2020 should be considered a bad outcome.

The point can be put bluntly: Take action today or need the entire globe to come together tomorrow.  We’ve never seen the entire planet come together to confront any problem and there are always rule-breakers and free-riders.  After 2020, that option goes away and the only hope is to develop a system that can bring everyone together.  I would rather not rely on that situation.  Action now is not just cheaper, smarter, and safer…it also does not rely on achieving amazingly bold political outcomes.

The next 8 years are key Now is key.  Delayed action simply makes it more and more likely that we will begin to face a climate cliff: a situation where even the best efforts will not achieve anything unless coupled with action from everyone else.  It turns out that full support of the Kyoto and post-Kyoto coalitions is the best way to keep the climate politics within reach.

So, yes, we knew. We knew well ahead of time that this could happen, and we knew global warming was already making it worse. We knew, but we did virtually nothing…We know that if you think this is bad, well, global warming will make it still worse in the future…Thus far in America, we’ve gotten the national conversation that we deserve—and the consequence is that we feel blindsided by disasters that somehow never came up until it was too late. In the wake of Sandy, then, how about a resolution? This time around, let’s all vow to think about the future, and about climate change, before the next tragedy strikes.

Climate scientists seem to be consistent that Sandy was almost certainly not “caused” by climate change, but that to ignore the impact that climate change had on Sandy would be ridiculous.  To say it simply, climate change appears to intensify extreme weather events.  The learning needed would be some significant action on climate change which has been so far lacking.

This argument has been taken farthest in a recent quote from Professor Michael E. Mann.  He told the L.A. Times that

This may be that sort of Cuyahoga River moment for climate change.  It has galvanized attention to this issue and the role that climate change may be playing with regard to the intensification of extreme weather.

The famous 1969 Cuyahoga River fire is often claimed as a catalyst for the environmentalism that followed the next decade (namely the Clean Water Act).  To say that Sandy is our “Cuyahoga River moment for climate change” is a significant claim, one which will certainly be part of the story if climate change action occurs in the next years.  This post is not going to evaluate whether the combination of devastation in New York City and Bloomberg’s apparent push for climate action will combine into a new climate moment.
Instead…

The question is whether we really should learn from disasters?  It seems that those quoted above are frustrated that preventative knowledge about the impacts of climate change have not resulted in political action and so they are hopeful that disaster-based learning will fill in that gap.  Certainly, humans learn both through preventative knowledge and though the after effects from disastrous impacts, but do we want to rely on the latter for climate action?

Like Mann and Mooney, I find the political neglect of climate change to be absolutely ridiculous.  But I’m afraid that learning through disasters might not result in a better discussion, it might actually lead to a worse one.  For a couple of reasons.

First, learning through disasters does not necessarily lead to mitigation.  I remember an incident from when I was younger of a celebration after a baseball game (or something) and the whole team went out for Pizza.  One member got sick and the lesson they learned was “Pizza at this place is not good” when the lesson they should have learned, and did much later, was that “I have issues with dairy and should limit its intake everywhere.”  My point is this, it is just as likely that people learn “We need better sea walls and pump systems in subways” as they learn “We need to mitigate climate change.”  Although adaptation will have to be part of any solution, it is quite possible that adaptation will be the only solution to come out of Sandy.

Second, learning through disasters may lead to politically expedient solutions.  Since natural disasters occur regularly and are largely unstoppable (although their effects are of course social and political), the solution may simply be lessening the consequences.  This results in politically expedient solutions rather than solutions to actually deal with the problem.  This may feed the issue above in resulting in a narrow focus solely on adaptation to climate change without any mitigation.

Finally, learning through disasters is not necessarily a collective process.  The fact is that we need learning to happen in multiple places at the same time.  Learning through disaster is likely to be partial and focused in few areas, if it occurs at all.  If the great ports of the world all get together and push for climate change action, it still is going to be restrained by places not directly impacted by these extreme weather events (of course we shouldn’t forget that summer drought and winter hurricanes may not be so unrelated).  The IPCC process has actually been quite good at tying diverse extreme weather events together and clearly augmenting how they are impacted by climate change.  Disaster-learning, in contrast, is always “winning the last war”-type mentality which responds to the last disaster that struck that location without the holistic approach that may be necessary.

We need to learn about climate change and how to protect ourselves and others from its impacts.  We’ve had plenty of opportunities to learn from them whether that is from predictive studies like the IPCC reports or whether that is from disasters.  The question is now, how do we learn from events as they change.

Hoping that the horrible destruction and death of Sandy at least gets us to think about what we are doing to the climate is one path.  This path has problems though with partial, easy options being preferred over the hard, collective choices that need to be taken.  Sandy may prove to be the focusing event that Mooney and Mann think it could be.  It could also prove to spur narrow, expedient solutions that allow us to neglect the importance of mitigation which needs to happen immediately.  Let’s hope we learn, and hope we learn the right way.

The Kihansi spray toad of Tanzania. Recently reintroduced into its unique ecosystem. (source: Discover News)

This is not just a small toad coming back, it is “the first reintroduction of an amphibian species that has been declared Extinct in the Wild by the IUCN.”  Let’s hope for the best for the reintroduced Kihansi toads, with a very limited range and some significant odds against them.  However, the effort to reintroduce them is precisely efforts that Lullaby of the Commons commends.

Regular blogging is going to get going again!  Sorry for the delay.